A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

Emanuele Bracco

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 164, issue C, 117-120

Abstract: We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

Keywords: Political budget cycle; Parking tickets; Tax collection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H26 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:117-120

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

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