Coordination and focality under gain–loss framing: Experimental evidence

Odile Poulsen and Krista Saral

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 164, issue C, 75-78

Abstract: Are people better at coordinating on a focal point when the game is framed as coordinating on a division of losses rather than gains? In an experimental coordination game, we vary the payoff framing (gain vs loss) and stake size (low vs high) to examine this question. We find that loss framing reduces coordination on the focal point, with the strongest effect observed in high stakes games.

Keywords: Coordination games; Focal point; Framing; Losses versus gains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:75-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.006

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