A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 164, issue C, 90-93
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent–object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability, one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.
Keywords: Matching; School choice; Lotteries; Ex-ante stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:90-93
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