Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: A convergence result

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 166, issue C, 10-13

Abstract: We provide a notion of bargaining set for finite economies where the proponents of objections (leaders) are endogenous. We show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations when the economy is replicated.

Keywords: Bargaining sets; Leader; Coalitions; Core; Veto mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D11 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:10-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.028

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