Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice

Zhenhua Jiao and Guoqiang Tian

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 166, issue C, 60-62

Abstract: This paper investigates the responsiveness of priority-based affirmative action in school choice. We consider two efficiency-improved mechanisms—Kesten’s EADAM (efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism) and DA-TTC mechanism (running deferred acceptance and then running top trading cycles algorithm). We show that neither EADAM nor DA-TTC is minimally responsive to the priority-based affirmative action policy. That is, under EADAM or DA-TTC, there are market situations in which a stronger affirmative action policy may result in a Pareto inferior assignment for the minority students.

Keywords: School choice; Affirmative action; Minimal responsiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:60-62

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.020

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