Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies

Longhua Liu, Junshan Lin and Chengzhong Qin

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 166, issue C, 83-85

Abstract: We show that a high-cost firm may be induced to compete less aggressively when its ownership is increasingly held by a low-cost firm. With asymmetric information on technologies, cross-holdings may make it desirable for both the high- and low-cost firms to reveal private information.

Keywords: Bayesian–Nash equilibrium; Cournot equilibrium; Cross-holding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:83-85

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.022

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