Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression
Jin Yeub Kim
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, issue C, 112-114
A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor’s military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.
Keywords: International conflict; Security threats; Stalemate; Military technology; Preventive attack (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 D74 D82 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:167:y:2018:i:c:p:112-114
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