Which equilibrium yields the highest expected revenue in second-price sealed-bid auctions?

Yusuke Inami

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, issue C, 97-98

Abstract: This paper considers second-price sealed-bid auctions among three or more bidders. We take into account all equilibria, and examine the maximum of the equilibrium revenues, using the result of Blume and Heidhues (2004). We show that if an assumption on distributions of bidders’ types holds, then a truth-telling strategy equilibrium brings the highest expected revenue to the seller. When the assumption is violated, however, the truth-telling strategy equilibrium may not be optimal.

Keywords: Second-price sealed-bid auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:167:y:2018:i:c:p:97-98

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.016

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