Impunity under pressure: On the role of emotions as a commitment device
Loukas Balafoutas and
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 168, issue C, 112-114
We examine the emotional component of rejections in the Impunity Game in a dual-process framework. Subjects reject unfair offers more frequently when decisions are taken under time pressure. This supports the role of emotions as a commitment device.
Keywords: Emotions; Commitment model; Impunity game; Time pressure; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:112-114
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