Friends in the Boardroom: Attendance, voting, and turnover

Jaehoon Kim and Hwa Ryung Lee

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 169, issue C, 11-14

Abstract: We analyze a unique data set on board activities of individual outside directors contingent on social ties to the CEO. We find that outside directors’ dissents are rare and this is even more so from those with social connections with the CEO. Dissenting outside directors, especially those without connections to the CEO face a significantly higher chance of being replaced. Besides, outside directors with social ties to the CEO tend to participate in board decision less often than independent ones.

Keywords: Board independence; Outside director; Social ties; Attendance; Voting; Turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 G30 K22 M59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:11-14

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.032

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