Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization

Christian Ewerhart and Guang-Zhen Sun

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 169, issue C, 51-54

Abstract: The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

Keywords: Contests; Mixed-strategy equilibrium; Rent dissipation; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518301836
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:51-54

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().