Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young’s characterization of the Shapley value revisited

André Casajus

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 169, issue C, 59-62

Abstract: We revisit Young’s (Young, 1985) characterization of the Shapley value by efficiency, symmetry, and marginality/strong monotonicity. In particular, we suggest a relaxation of symmetry called sign symmetry. While symmetry requires equally productive players to obtain the same payoffs, sign symmetry only requires their payoffs to have the same sign. It turns out that sign symmetry can take the place of symmetry in Young’s characterization.

Keywords: TU game; Shapley value; Marginality; Strong monotonicity; Symmetry; Sign symmetry; Weak differential monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:59-62

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.017

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