Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences

Claus-Jochen Haake and Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 170, issue C, 39-41

Abstract: We show that modifications of the Boston school choice mechanism, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm and the top trading cycles algorithm where the colleges’ priorities are adjusted according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner generate the same outcome. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the question which of the three algorithms is chosen becomes immaterial.

Keywords: School choice; Boston mechanism; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Top trading cycles; Manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:170:y:2018:i:c:p:39-41

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033

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