Parents’ strategic transfers and sibling competition in the presence of pay-as-you-go pensions

Akira Yakita

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 170, issue C, 63-65

Abstract: In a non-cooperative Nash game in which children compete for their parents’ financial transfers, we demonstrate that if the children’s attention is sufficiently perceived by elderly parents as a merit good, then a payroll tax hike might increase children’s attention devoted to elderly parents, thereby reducing the labor supply of grown-up children and possibly reducing elderly pension benefits.

Keywords: Children’s attention; Sibling competition; Strategic bequest motive; Transfer-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D64 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:170:y:2018:i:c:p:63-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.001

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