On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders

Fei Li () and Peter Norman

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 170, issue C, 66-70

Abstract: In a canonical multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) information can be arbitrarily correlated, (ii) senders reveal information simultaneously, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper constructs examples that demonstrate that adding senders can result in a loss of information if any of these assumptions is violated.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Belief-splitting; Multiple senders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518301964
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:170:y:2018:i:c:p:66-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.023

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().