 On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperativesEconomics Letters, 2018, vol. 171, issue C, 41-45 Abstract: We consider a cooperative formed by a large number of workers differentiated by their initial endowment of wealth, which is both primary input (labor) and consumption (leisure). The cooperative is characterized by its wealth distribution, and produces a consumption good from labor, which allocates among workers according to a convex combination of the Proportional and the Egalitarian rule. In the first stage, workers decide this combination by simple majority. In a second stage, they choose how much labor to provide to the cooperative. We find that when in the cooperative’s wealth distribution, the median wealth is lower (higher) than the average, the degree of meritocracy chosen by workers is lower (higher) than that of the optimum, and coincides with it when both statistics coincide. This choice has similar consequences on the cooperative’s labor–output, since it increases with respect to the degree of meritocracy. Keywords: Cooperative production; Egalitarianism; Meritocracy; Majority voting; Two-stage equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:171:y:2018:i:c:p:41-45 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.027 Access Statistics for this article Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.