A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents

Makoto Hagiwara

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 171, issue C, 51-53

Abstract: We study double implementation of social choice functions in Nash equilibria and undominated Nash equilibria. We show that if there are at least three agents and each agent is “semi-socially-responsible” with respect to a “unanimous” social choice function, then a simple mechanism doubly implements this social choice function.

Keywords: Simple mechanism; Double implementation; Semi-social-responsibility; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:171:y:2018:i:c:p:51-53

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008

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