Tullock contests reward information advantages

Avishay Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko (), Diego Moreno (), Aner Sela and Benyamin Shitovitz

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 172, issue C, 34-36

Abstract: In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j, regardless of the information of the other players.

Keywords: Tullock contests; Common value; Information advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:172:y:2018:i:c:p:34-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.017

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