A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations
Geofferey Jiyun Kim,
Jerim Kim and
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 173, issue C, 1-5
We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.
Keywords: Lottery Blotto game; Heterogeneous items; Asymmetric valuations; Nash equilibria; Lagrange multiplier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:1-5
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