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A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations

Geofferey Jiyun Kim, Jerim Kim and Bara Kim

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 173, issue C, 1-5

Abstract: We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.

Keywords: Lottery Blotto game; Heterogeneous items; Asymmetric valuations; Nash equilibria; Lagrange multiplier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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