The roll call interpretation of the Shapley value

Sascha Kurz and Stefan Napel

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 173, issue C, 108-112

Abstract: The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter’s Shapley value can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e., to bring about the required majority or to make this impossible for others. We characterize the joint probability distributions over cooperation patterns that permit this roll call interpretation: individual votes may be interdependent but must be exchangeable.

Keywords: Shapley value; Shapley–Shubik index; Roll call model; Voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:108-112

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.025

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