The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

Josue Ortega

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 174, issue C, 48-51

Abstract: Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent’s spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

Keywords: Social integration; Large matching markets; Spouse ranking; Assignment schemes; Replica economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:174:y:2019:i:c:p:48-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028

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