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Multiple prizes in research tournaments

Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer and Andreas Wagener

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 175, issue C, 118-120

Abstract: A Fullerton–McAfee research tournament with multiple prizes is strategically equivalent to a sequential multi-prize Tullock contest. Contest designers, aiming to maximize total research efforts, should therefore allocate a given prize sum to a single prize rather than to several ones.

Keywords: Tournament design; Contests; Prizes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.024

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