Multiple prizes in research tournaments
Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun and
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 175, issue C, 118-120
A Fullerton–McAfee research tournament with multiple prizes is strategically equivalent to a sequential multi-prize Tullock contest. Contest designers, aiming to maximize total research efforts, should therefore allocate a given prize sum to a single prize rather than to several ones.
Keywords: Tournament design; Contests; Prizes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:175:y:2019:i:c:p:118-120
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().