Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games

Chuyi Fang and Bin Wu

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 175, issue C, 40-42

Abstract: We formulate the notion of a socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distribution in a large distributionalized game with traits, and show that a socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distribution exists. We also show that no-where equivalence condition is not only sufficient but also necessary to the existence of a socially-maximal Nash equilibrium in a class of large individualized games with traits.

Keywords: Large distributionalized games; Nash equilibrium distribution; Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:175:y:2019:i:c:p:40-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.007

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