Sequential (one-against-all) contests
Levi-Tsedek, Netanel and
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 175, issue C, 9-11
We study sequential contests with n+1 players. The defender competes sequentially against n heterogeneous attackers in n different contests. While the defender has to win all the contests, each of the attackers needs to win only his own contest. We demonstrate that if the players compete in all-pay contests, the order of the attackers does not affect the defender’s expected payoff. On the other hand, if the players compete in Tullock contests, the defender maximizes his expected payoff if he competes first against the strongest attacker (the attacker with the highest value of winning), next against the second strongest attacker and so on until the last stage in which he competes against the weakest attacker.
Keywords: Tullock contests; All-pay contests; Sequential contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:175:y:2019:i:c:p:9-11
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