Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities

Ryusuke Shinohara

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 176, issue C, 86-89

Abstract: I introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash equilibria in a quasi-supermodular game with a strict single-crossing property and monotonic externalities.

Keywords: Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Undominated strategy; Quasi-supermodular game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176519300059
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:176:y:2019:i:c:p:86-89

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.01.005

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().