Decomposing a balanced game: A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 176, issue C, 9-13
The Bondareva–Shapley condition is the most eminent necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a transferable utility game to be nonempty. In this paper, we provide a new necessary and sufficient condition. We show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game can be decomposed into some simple games.
Keywords: Cooperative game; Core; Decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:176:y:2019:i:c:p:9-13
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