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The proposer’s behavior in the ultimatum game in 11 Mexican villages

Natalia Candelo Londono (), Catherine Eckel () and Cathleen Johnson

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 177, issue C, 5-8

Abstract: Previous research suggests several motivations behind the proposer’s behavior in the Ultimatum Game, deviating from an income maximizing strategy. Proposers who deviate from this strategy are more altruistic, more risk averse, have false beliefs about the norm of fairness in their society, and therefore, offer more than what is acceptable for the responder in this game. We test these hypotheses with a large representative sample of 1009 subjects from 11 villages across Mexico. Participants make decisions in an ultimatum game and a dictator game. Our results vary systematically across villages, and support that proposers’ decisions are motivated by altruistic motives and their own hypothetical Minimum Acceptable Offer (i.e., false consensus: their beliefs), more than their risk preferences.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Altruism; Risk; False consensus; Beliefs; Lab-in-the-field (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 O1 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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