Yet another characterization of the majority rule
José Alcantud ()
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 177, issue C, 52-55
We prove an alternative characterization of the majority rule for unrestricted societies and a binary agenda. It uses neither of the three original axioms from the characterization by May (1952) for fixed societies that confront two alternatives.
Keywords: Majority rule; Voting; Axiomatization; Social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:177:y:2019:i:c:p:52-55
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