Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition

Mustafa Yildirim

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 177, issue C, 81-84

Abstract: I investigate team formation in a legislative bargaining model in which both the surplus and recognition are endogenous. I find that the optimal team size increases with stricter agreement rules and longer-sighted agents but remains too small from the social perspective. Moreover, the optimal size may not exhaust increasing returns to scale.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; Voting rule; Rent-seeking; Team size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D2 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176519300394
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:177:y:2019:i:c:p:81-84

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.002

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().