Supply function competition with asymmetric costs: Theory and experiment
Andreas Hefti and
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 178, issue C, 24-27
We study a multi-unit auction, where bidders differ in their marginal costs, and compare the outcome to the Bertrand (or single-unit auction) analogue.
Keywords: Supply function competition; Market power; Multi-unit auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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