A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem

Alexander Karpov

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 178, issue C, 63-65

Abstract: The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under the new condition, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is stable, consistent, strategy-proof, Pareto optimal for men, and Pareto optimal for women.

Keywords: Market partition paradox; Stability; Consistency; Interrupter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:178:y:2019:i:c:p:63-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.022

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