Pricing of Islamic deposit insurance

Nasim Sabah and M. Kabir Hassan

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 178, issue C, 91-94

Abstract: We present an Islamic deposit insurance model with both government and private insurers. We show that government insurer provides strong incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks, and private insurers can eliminate such incentives by charging a higher fee.

Keywords: Islamic deposit insurance; Banking regulation; Risk-based premium; Systematic risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G22 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:178:y:2019:i:c:p:91-94

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.01.013

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