Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value

Xun-Feng Hu

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 179, issue C, 1-4

Abstract: In this paper, we propose axiomatic results with two variations of the recent coalitional desirability axiom (Beal et al., 2019), respectively named as coalitional surplus desirability and average coalitional surplus desirability. Particularly, we show that while the first variation is incompatible with the well-known efficiency axiom, the second variation is characteristic for the equal surplus division value, together with the well-known efficiency and additivity axioms.

Keywords: TU game; Equal division value; Equal surplus division value; Coalitional desirability; Coalitional surplus desirability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:1-4

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.005

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