The welfare costs of bank regulation by deposit rate ceilings

Carsten Nielsen and Gerd Weinrich

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 179, issue C, 33-37

Abstract: In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.

Keywords: Bank regulation; Moral hazard; Deposit rate ceilings; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:33-37

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012

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