Information aggregation with a continuum of types
Irem Bozbay and
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 46-49
We study the problem of designing a voting rule which makes voting by cut-off strategies efficient for settings where voters have state-dependent common preferences over and vote on accepting or rejecting an issue but hold private information in the form of continuous types about the true state. We show that such rules only exist under a restrictive condition on the model parameters.
Keywords: Continuous types; Binary voting; Efficient information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 D71 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Information aggregation with continuum of types (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:46-49
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