Responsive affirmative action in school choice: A comparison study

Zhenhua Jiao and Guoqiang Tian

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, issue C, 140-145

Abstract: This note provides a comparison study on responsiveness of two extensively used mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice. For priority-based affirmative action, we show that, if a stronger priority-based affirmative action favors minority students by giving full priority to the minority, then such a policy makes each minority student weakly better off under the student-proposing deferred acceptance (henceforth, DA) mechanism. However, the top trading cycles (henceforth, TTC) mechanism does not satisfy this property. Under the DA mechanism, if the original problem gives full priority to the minority, then the assignment of minority students does not change when the problem moves to a higher level of affirmative action. On the contrary, this property does not hold under the TTC mechanism.

Keywords: School choice; Affirmative action; Responsiveness; Deferred acceptance mechanism; Top trading cycles mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:140-145

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.024

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