Who delegates? Evidence from dictator games

Glynis Gawn and Robert Innes

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, issue C, 186-189

Abstract: We conduct and compare two binary dictator experiments in which the available payoff profiles are identical. In one of the games, selfish payoffs can be probabilistically implemented either via a delegate or directly; in the other game, the same payoffs can only be implemented by direct choice. We find that (1) the delegation option is almost entirely chosen by those who would otherwise be generous dictators, (2) the delegation option thereby leads to a greater overall propensity for selfish payoffs, and (3) in the delegation game, selfish dictators exhibit a net preference for direct vs. delegated decisions, consistent with recent research on decision rights.

Keywords: Delegation; Moral preference; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:186-189

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.027

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