Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm and Ran I. Shorrer

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, issue C, 40-42

Abstract: We show that many-to-one matching markets with contracts where colleges’ preferences satisfy the hidden substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kominers (2015) may not be embedded, in the sense of Echenique (2012) into a Kelso and Crawford(1982) matching-with-salaries market. Our proof relies on a configurations of preferences that is observed in many college admissions markets.

Keywords: Matching; Matching with contracts; Matching with salaries; embedding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:40-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.025

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