Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition

Alfa Farah

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, issue C, 74-76

Abstract: This letter introduces a disparity in the costs of rent appropriation in a yardstick competition model and shows that the yardstick bias caused by fiscal disparity might be mitigated. In particular, the incumbent of the fiscally rich jurisdiction can no longer fully exploit his or her fiscal advantage.

Keywords: Yardstick competition; Fiscal disparity; Institutions; Rent appropriation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:74-76

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.029

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