Data portability, data disclosure and data-induced switching costs: Some unintended consequences of the General Data Protection Regulation

Jan Krämer and Nadine Stüdlein

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, issue C, 99-103

Abstract: We develop a simple game-theoretic model to demonstrate that with the new General Data Protection Regulation’s (GDPR) right to port data between content providers (CPs), (i) the incumbent CP has less incentives to preserve users’ privacy, (ii) a new entrant CP will charge higher prices for its service, and (iii) customers of the new CP are worse off, while customers of the incumbent CP are better off.

Keywords: General Data Protection Regulation; Data portability; Switching costs; Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L51 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:99-103

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.015

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