Electoral economics: Maximizing local representation under proportionality
Werner Antweiler
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 182, issue C, 109-113
Abstract:
Electoral systems struggle to combine proportionality (fair representation) and direct accountability (local representation). Economic optimization tools can be used to devise an improvement to conventional forms of proportional representation. Single or dual optimal assignment of constituencies can provide better local representation by maximizing the number of voters who are represented directly.
Keywords: Elections; Electoral systems; Proportional representation; Binary integer programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D72 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:182:y:2019:i:c:p:109-113
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.015
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