The price elasticity of warm-glow giving

Luca Gandullia ()

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 182, issue C, 30-32

Abstract: We examine the charitable giving behavior of warm-glow givers in response to the same donation incentive structure, but with formally different schemes. At this aim we implement a large online survey (N=1655) using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. First, we elicit and measure warm-glow giving. Then, we employ a between-subjects design in which each warm-glow donor (N=881) is randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups that differ for the subsidy (rebate or matching) and is asked to make a series of allocation decisions between himself and a charity of his choice. The results show that contributions are significantly more responsive to matching (-1.15) than to rebate subsidies (-0.17). Moreover, we provide evidence that, under rebate, price elasticity decreases as the warm-glow magnitude increases. For weak warm-glow givers, price elasticity is double that for strong warm-glow donors.

Keywords: Charitable giving; Warm-glow; Price elasticity; Online experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 H24 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:182:y:2019:i:c:p:30-32

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.046

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