Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities

Tomohiko Kawamori and Toshiji Miyakawa

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 183, issue C, -

Abstract: We consider a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game where partial breakdowns, such as the rejecter of a proposal exiting from the game, take place with a positive probability, and externalities accompany the formation of coalitions. We present an example in which there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) such that a bargaining delay occurs. We also show that under no partial breakdowns or no externalities, delay does not occur in any SSPE.

Keywords: Coalitional bargaining; Rejecter-exit partial breakdown; Externality; Delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:16

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108541

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