Control rights in complex partnerships revisited

Takao Takasago

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 183, issue C, -

Abstract: We extend Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) by allowing parities to have different bargaining powers and applying the generalized Nash bargaining solution. We claim that the relative bargaining power plays an important role in determining the optimal allocation of authority. We obtain the generalized results and point to the possibility that the introduction of generalized Nash bargaining may lead to opposite conclusions. Moreover, our model encompasses the case of pure public goods and can also be regarded as a generalization of Schmitz (2013).

Keywords: Generalized Nash bargaining power; Control rights; Incomplete contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D86 H41 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:35

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108587

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