EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Two-sided heterogeneity and exchange rate pass-through

Jianwei Xu, Qingyuan Du and Yaqi Wang

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 183, issue C, -

Abstract: The bargaining process between exporters and importers is key to understand the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Following the framework established by Goldberg and Tille (2013), we use a Colombian exporter–importer matched data from 2005 to 2014 to identify the relative bargaining power between exporters and importers, and investigate its effect on exchange rate pass-through. The results show that, within each exporter–importer pair, the role of importers is at least as important as exporters, and higher bargaining power of importers are usually associated with higher exchange rate pass-through. Our findings are robust to a variety of bargaining ability measurement, alternative empirical specifications, and the selection of certain industries.

Keywords: Exchange rate pass-through; Bargaining; Importer heterogeneity; Exporter heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F3 F4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651930254X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:38

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108534

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2021-08-11
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:38