Mind-changes at the FOMC
Alessandro Riboni and
Francisco Ruge-Murcia
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 184, issue C
Abstract:
This paper develops a model of committee decision-making where members of different expertise deliberate and share private information prior to voting. The model predicts that members truthfully reveal their private information and are willing to “change their minds” as a result of deliberation. The predictions of the model are evaluated using data from the Federal Open Market Committee.
Keywords: U.S. Federal Reserve; FOMC; Monetary policy; Collective decision-making; Greenbooks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519302782
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108565
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