Inefficiency in alternately repeated games with overlapping generations
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 184, issue C
We model alternately repeated pure coordination games with overlapping generations. We characterize players’ behavior in subgame perfect equilibria while varying exogenous parameters. The results show that inefficient equilibria with almost the worst payoff arise when one-shot payoffs grow over time.
Keywords: Repeated game; Alternating move game; Overlapping generations game; Pure coordination game; Inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303118
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