Collusion-proof and fair auctions

Martin Hagen

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).

Keywords: Mechanism design; Social choice theory; Auctions; Group strategy-proofness; Symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303404

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108682

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