Collusion-proof and fair auctions
Martin Hagen ()
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C
In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).
Keywords: Mechanism design; Social choice theory; Auctions; Group strategy-proofness; Symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303404
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