Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities

María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena and Matteo Triossi

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Marriage market; Externalities; Incentives; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D62 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s016517651930343x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108688

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