Informational benefits of managerial myopia

Cheng Li

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: We show that managerial myopia has an informational benefit that has been overlooked in the prior research. Compared with managers who care sufficiently about the long-term, a moderately myopic manager incentivizes the proponent of a risky long-term project to produce more information about the project, leading to more informed decision making and higher firm value.

Keywords: Firm value; Managerial objectives; Persuasion; Signal informativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303519

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108705

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